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A RISK BASED APPROACH FOR SELECTING SERVICES
IN BUSINESS PROCESS EXECUTION
Stefan Sackmann, Lutz Lowis, Kai Kittel1
Abstract
The vision of automated business processes within a service-oriented paradigm includes the flexible
orchestration of IT services. Whenever alternative services are available for activities in an ITsupported business process, an automated decision is worth aspiring to. According to valueoriented management, this decision should be motivated economically and also requires taking
account of risk. This paper presents a novel approach for assessing the risk of IT services, based on
vulnerability information as can be obtained in the form of publicly available Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) data.

1. Automating IT service selection
Market forces are raising companies’ ability to respond quickly and flexibly to changing demands,
which is seen as one of the main competitive advantages of the future [1, 23]. To keep pace, directing business models towards automation is still regarded as an important strategic topic [25] and
aligning the technological infrastructure to service oriented architecture (SOA) seems a feasible and
promising way [10, 16]. Apparently, present SOA and standards such as BPEL or BPMN are still in
need of improvement to satisfy business demands [29] and the present hype around service
orientation is endangered by setbacks [13]. Nevertheless, prominent suppliers of hard- and software
are already embodying service orientation into their products: IBM offers Websphere [19], SAP
integrates Netweaver [6], and Microsoft uses services in Windows Vista [4].
Besides the technical feasibility of SOA, exploiting the full potential of services requires solutions
to several business demands. In this contribution, the focus is laid on one of these issues: the
automated selection between alternative IT services available for supporting the execution of
business process activities. Since the ability of an IT service to meet business process-specific
protection goals is crucial, a method for assessing the risk of an IT service within the context of the
supported business process is developed. The method consists of two major parts: The first part
proposes a new way to measure the probability of achieving protection goals within an IT service
by assessing vulnerabilities. The second part extends business process models by an economic decision algorithm that also takes risk into consideration and enables an automated decision between
alternative IT services in the concrete execution context. Addressing these two parts, the remainder
of this contribution is structured as follows: in section 2, a layer-based model is introduced bringing
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the economic and technical view of IT risk together and serving as starting point for structuring IT
services. Based upon this model, in section 3, a measure for the ability of an IT service to achieve
protection goals from IT security research is presented and discussed. In section 4, this measure is
integrated into an economic decision algorithm for business process activities taking the riskiness
of alternative IT services into consideration. Subsequently, it is demonstrated how the algorithm
works by means of an exemplified purchase process. The contribution concludes by discussing
limitations of the method and by proposing possible solutions.

2. IT Risk Reference Model - Bridging the technical and economic view
The challenges to a value-oriented risk management process and continuous risk assessment, resulting from a constantly changing IT support of business processes as in SOA, have been discussed in
[20, 21]. Following the notion of service orientation, automating business processes means that
services are not exclusively used for one specific business process but manifold. Furthermore, the
orchestration of the IT services changes dynamically according to the business context and is not
statically wired in advance at the time when the business process is designed. Since the economic
risk depends on the business process supported, the riskiness of an IT service should be specified
independently of its actual integration. Therefore, typical measures for assessing IT security that
already include economic exposure, e.g. an annual loss expectancy (ALE) [3] or business adjusted
risk (BAR) [12], are unsuitable. It seems more advisable to look for measures that characterize the
riskiness of IT services in a form that can be integrated into the service description and thus, e.g.,
become part of a service or protection level agreement (SLA/PLA) [14]. The approach in hand has
been developed with a focus on services provided within a trusted domain, i.e. a company’s internal
services or external services of business partners under contractual relationship.

Economic
handling of
IT risks

Technological
handling of
IT risks

Business Process

IT Services / IT Infrastructure

Vulnerabilities

Threats

Violations of protection goals
disturb the business process
and have (usually negative)
effects on company results

Attacks exploit
vulnerabilities and
violate protection goals

Figure 1: IT Risk Reference Model [20]

For measuring the riskiness of IT services, the measures used should rely on a systematic modeling
of relations between causes and effects of IT risks. For this purpose, the IT Risk Reference Model
has been developed [20] that is structured following a hierarchical abstraction layer model as used
in computer science for reducing complexity, e.g. in network communication [28]. On the basis of
four different layers (Figure 1), the economic, process-oriented view is brought together with the
technical, threat-oriented view of IT risk. Beginning with the economic view, the top layer represents the “effects” and contains all activities of the business process that are regarded as assets from
a risk perspective. The next layer contains all IT services and their underlying IT infrastructure
representing IT resources for the superordinated process activities. Vulnerabilities constitute the
“bridge” between the economic and the technical layers since they are possible points of attack for
threats violating protection goals of the IT applications [24]. Thus, since a large part of attacks re358

sult from exploitation of known vulnerabilities (see e.g. [22]), the following layer represents the
vulnerabilities of these applications, while the set of all known threats is part of the bottom layer
representing the causes.
Although the IT Risk Reference Model has been developed with a different focus on measuring
changes between causes and effects of IT risk, the achievable link provides a suitable starting point
for the aspired measure. Since vulnerabilities can only be identified in relation to protection goals
[17], measuring the probabilities of an IT service to achieve protection goals that are relevant to
superordinated business processes is seen as a promising approach. In IT security research, there
are several protection goals discussed [5, 17, 30]. For the beginning, focusing on the three main
protection goals, confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA), is proposed for mainly three
reasons: firstly, since the riskiness of an IT service is highly dependent on the IT security achieved,
these protection goals are relevant for business processes [18]. Secondly, there is a well established
methodical understanding of these protection goals in IT security research [2]. Thirdly, focusing on
high-level protection goals does not limit the applicability of the method: more context-specific
protection goals can be considered. According to this view, an IT service is considered to be secure
(no risk) if it has no known vulnerabilities affecting the IT service’s confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of data or processes.

Business Process

C* = expected loss in case of violation of confidentiality
I* = expected loss in case of violation of integrity
A* = expected loss in case of violation of availability

C*, I*, A*

Decision:
IT Service with minimal expected loss

C 1 , I 1 , A1

C2 , I2 , A2

IT Service1

IT Service2

Cn , In , An

…

IT Servicen

Ck = probability of service k‘s confidentiality
Ik = probability of service k‘s integrity
Ak = probability of service k‘s availability

Figure 2: Protection goals – Linking business processes and IT service

A decision-theory based selection requires two measures (Figure 2). Firstly, the damage resulting
from non-achievement different protection goals has to be quantified according to the context of the
business process. This could be realized either by relative evaluation (see, e.g., the POSeM model
of [18]) or monetary assessment, e.g. in the form of expected loss and will be discussed in more
detail in section 4. Secondly, it is necessary to determine the probability of an IT service violating
the protection goals. For assessing these probabilities automatically, a new method is proposed in
the following section.

3. Measuring IT Service Riskiness
Following the IT Risk Reference Model, vulnerabilities are the key factor since they allow attackers
to harm protection goals. It is assumed that not all known vulnerabilities can instantly be closed for
economical and technical reasons (e.g., limited time and money, patches not available). Otherwise,
a risk-based approach would be pointless. Prominent methods for identifying vulnerabilities are
penetration tests [2] or source code analysis [7]. Furthermore, for the technical infrastructure on
which the IT services run, vulnerabilities can be queried from publicly accessible vulnerability
databases. This allows an initial estimation of a company’s security level by looking at the sheer
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number of known vulnerabilities, as well as gauging the effects a given vulnerability’s exploitation
would have on the individual IT security protection goals.
3.1. Vulnerability Information Sources
The approach presented works with any vulnerability database that offers information on the CIA
impact caused through exploiting a given vulnerability. In this contribution, the well known
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [8] database is used offering data according to the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) as shown in Table 1. The Base Score Metrics not
only indicate the impact of exploiting a vulnerability, but also where it can be exploited from, how
complex the exploit is, and how often the attacker must authenticate to the target. The Temporal
Score Metrics offer detailed information on the availability of an exploit, existing countermeasures,
and the credibility of the vulnerability details.
Table 1: CVE scheme and CVSS values [9]

Unique CVE name: CVE-abcd-wxyz
Affected Product/Service: [name and version]
Original release date: mm/dd/yyyy; Last revised: mm/dd/yyyy; Source: [e.g.] US-CERT/NIST
Overview [textual description]
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools. [list of links to other databases, e.g., SecurityFocus]
Vulnerable software and versions: Configuration [list of operating systems and patch levels]
Technical Details
Vulnerability Type: [e.g.] Input Validation (CWE-20); [links to CVE Standard Vulnerability Entries and
Common Platform Enumeration]
CVSS Base Score: 0 (Low) to 10 (High) (Impact Subscore 0 to 10, Exploitability Subscore 0 to 10)
CVSS Temporal Score: 0 (Low) to 10 (High)
CVSS v2 Vector: (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)
Published: mm/dd/yyyy

CVSS metric group

CVSS metric

CVSS values

Base Score Metrics

Exploitability Metrics Access Vector

local (0.395), adjacent network (0.646), network (1)

Access Complexity

low (0.71), medium (0.61), high (0.35)

Authentication

none (0.704), single (0.56), multiple (0.45)

Impact Metrics Confidentiality Impact

Temporal Score Metrics

none (0), partial (0.275), complete (0.66)

Integrity Impact

none (0), partial (0.275), complete (0.66)

Availability Impact

none (0), partial (0.275), complete (0.66)

Exploitability

unproven (0.85), proof-of-concept (0.9),
functional (0.95), high (1), not defined (1)

Remediation Level

official fix (0.87), temporary fix (0.9), workaround
(0.95), unavailable (1), not defined (1)

Report Confidence

unconfirmed (0.9), uncorroborated (0.95),
confirmed (1), not defined (1)

At present, the vast majority of CVE entries relates to software applications other than web services. In future, once a critical amount of web services is in operational use, web service vulnerabilities can be expected to be listed in CVE or a similar database. Therefore, for assessing IT services,
exemplary values of actual CVE entries for software applications are used in this contribution.
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3.2. CVSS and Attack Probabilities
In practice, attack probabilities often rely on subjective expert estimates given by, e.g., system
administrators with a varying degree of experience, which is seen as a major drawback in the IT
security field [27]. Since web services might come and go too quickly to allow expert estimates or
even collecting historical data on the attack probabilities, assessing vulnerabilities might provide
valuable information and extracting probabilities from CVSS data is seen as promising method:
CVSS metrics reflect a strong link between threats, vulnerabilities, and the violation of protection
goals. Also, a correlation between the effort in exploiting vulnerabilities and the probability of successful attacks can be assumed. Although CVSS metrics give, strictly spoken, no information about
the actual probability of an attack, taking this link into consideration for a risk assessment can be
expected to lead to more accurate results than existing methods for estimating attack probabilities.
This issue is not yet fully analyzed and subject to further evaluation and research. However, once a
suitable method for measuring attack probabilities for IT services should become evident, this could
be incorporated into the proposed approach without any methodical change.
3.3. Measures for Protection Goals
In its simplest form, CVSS calculates a score between 0 and 10 for any vulnerability in the database, representing the lowest threat level, 10 the highest. Following the CVSS calculation, the base
score is calculated according to the following equation [9]:
BaseScore = round _ to _ 1 _ decimal ((0.6 ⋅ Impact + 0.4 ⋅ Exploitability − 1.5) ⋅ f (Impact ))

(1)

The components Impact, Exploitability, and f (Impact) are calculated according to the following
equations, whereby the absolute numbers are given by the CVSS method:
Impact = 10.41 ⋅ (1 − (1 − ConfidentialityImpact ) ⋅ (1 − IntegrityImpact ) ⋅ (1 − AvailabilityImpact ))

(2)

Exploitability = 20 ⋅ AccessVector ⋅ AccessComplexity ⋅ Authentication

(3)

if Impact = 0
⎧0
f (Impact ) = ⎨
⎩1.176 otherwise

(4)

According to the temporal situation, the BaseScore can be combined with the temporal exploitability values to include information on automated exploits and fixes according to equation (5) and (6):
TempBase = Exploitability ⋅ RemediationLevel ⋅ ReportConfidence

(5)

TemporalScore = round _ to _ 1 _ decimal (BaseScore ⋅ TempBase )

(6)

However, neither the BaseScore nor the TemporalScore show which protection goal(s) the vulnerability under consideration puts at risk. Therefore, an adaptation of the calculation is proposed here
for calculating the scores for each protection goal separately. This requires an adaptation of the
CVSS values of the impact metrics by replacing equation (2). In order to keep the range of values
between 0 and 10, the weights are adapted as follows without changing the basic method of CVSS:
Table 2: Adjusted CIA impact values

Metric
Confidentiality Impact
Integrity Impact
Availability Impact

Values
none (0), partial (1.7), complete (10)
none (0), partial (1.7), complete (10)
none (0), partial (1.7), complete (10)
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Accordingly, equation (4) is split up and adapted for each of the three protection goals:
if ConfidentialityImpact = 0
⎧0
f (CImpact ) = ⎨
⎩1.176 otherwise

(4a)

if IntegrityImpact = 0
⎧0
f (IImpact ) = ⎨
⎩1.176 otherwise

(4b)

if AvailabilityImpact = 0
⎧0
f ( AImpact ) = ⎨
⎩1.176 otherwise

(4c)

Based on these adjustments, the probability that an exploit of the vulnerability under consideration
will harm one of the protection goals can be calculated as follows:
C = (0.6 ⋅ CImpact + 0.4 ⋅ Exploitability − 1.5) ⋅ f (CImpact ) ⋅ Temp ⋅ 0.1

with 0 ≤ C ≤ 1

(6a)

I = (0.6 ⋅ IImpact + 0.4 ⋅ Exploitability − 1.5) ⋅ f (IImpact ) ⋅ Temp ⋅ 0.1

with 0 ≤ I ≤ 1

(6b)

A = (0.6 ⋅ AImpact + 0.4 ⋅ Exploitability − 1.5) ⋅ f ( AImpact ) ⋅ Temp ⋅ 0.1

with 0 ≤ A ≤ 1

(6c)

As single services can have several vulnerabilities, multiple CVSS scores must sometimes be combined. Following the approach of [24], the arithmetic average is used as total score. In the case
where further information on dependencies between several vulnerabilities is available, e.g. that
they can only be exploited in a specific order, this calculation of course can be replaced by more
detailed approaches as, e.g., discussed in [26].
3.4. Calculation Example
With the adapted CVSS score at hand, every IT service can be assessed regarding its probability of
achieving each of the protection goals. This is demonstrated for an exemplary service with three
vulnerabilities (see Table 3) which will later be referred to when demonstrating the outstanding
economic decision.
Table 3: Sample vulnerability details

IT Service1
CVSS metrics
Access Vector
Access Complexity
Authentication
Confidentiality Impact
Integrity Impact
Availability Impact
Exploitability
Remediation Level
Report Confidence

Values
Vulnerability 1.1
local (0.395)
high (0.35)
none (0.704)
partial (1.7),
none (0)
none (0)
unproven (0.85)
official fix (0.87)
unconfirmed (0.9)

Vulnerability 1.2
local (0.395)
high (0.35)
single (0.56)
none (0)
partial (1.7)
none (0)
unproven (0.85)
unavailable (1)
uncorroborated (0.95)

Vulnerability 1.3
local (0.395)
high (0.35)
multiple (0.45)
none (0)
none (0)
partial (1.7)
high (1)
unavailable (1)
uncorroborated (0.95)

The CIA-probabilities of exploitability for IT Service1 as well as the temporal scores can then be
calculated according to equations (3) and (5). Inserting the results into equation (6a), (6b), or (6c),
and calculating the corresponding impact with equation (4a), (4b), or (4c), the complete equation
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for the three protection goals can be resolved. Using the exemplary values from vulnerabilities 1.1,
1.2, and 1.3 (see Table 3) leads to the following results.
C = (0.6 ⋅ 1.7 + 0.4 ⋅ ( 20 ⋅ 0.395 ⋅ 0.35 ⋅ 0.704) − 1.5) ⋅ 1.176 ⋅ (0.85 ⋅ 0.87 ⋅ 0.9) ⋅ 0.1 = 0.023

I = (0.6 ⋅ 1.7 + 0.4 ⋅ ( 20 ⋅ 0.395 ⋅ 0.35 ⋅ 0.56) − 1.5) ⋅ 1.176 ⋅ (0.85 ⋅ 1 ⋅ 0.95) ⋅ 0.1 = 0.013
A = (0.6 ⋅ 1.7 + 0.4 ⋅ ( 20 ⋅ 0.395 ⋅ 0.35 ⋅ 0.45) − 1.5) ⋅ 1.176 ⋅ (1 ⋅ 1 ⋅ 0.95) ⋅ 0.1 = 0.002

In the same way, the CIA-probabilities for the other IT services can be calculated according to their
vulnerabilities. Omitting the detailed values for brevity, the following vulnerabilities and probabilities are assumed.
Table 4: Exemplary services and their vulnerabilities
Vuln. #
C
I
A

1.1
0.023

IT Service1
1.2
1.3

2.1
0.029

IT Service2
2.2
2.3

0.013

0.011
0.002

3.1
0.002

3.2

IT Service3
3.3
3.4
0.011

0.001
0.014

3.5

3.6

0.015
0.035

0.012

Given that vulnerabilities 1.1 to 1.3 can be found in IT Service1, IT Service2 has vulnerabilities 2.1
to 2.3, and vulnerabilities 3.1 to 3.6 are related to IT Service3, the resulting probabilities are shown
in Figure 3. To combine the values of several vulnerabilities within one service, the arithmetic average is used as mentioned above. In addition, since low CVSS values stand for a low threat level, the
values have to be inverted for getting the aspired probabilities: for example, vulnerability 2.1 in
service 2 has a low threat level of 0.029 with regard to confidentiality, i.e. a high probability of
0.971 of achieving that protection goal.
C1 = 0.977
I1 = 0.987
A1 = 0.998

C2 = 0.971
I2 = 0.989
A2 = 0.986

C3 = 0.9935
I3 = 0.992
A3 = 0.9765

IT Service1

IT Service2

IT Service3

Figure 3: Exemplary services with CIA probabilities

4. Automated Selection of IT Services
The characterization of the IT services according to their capability to achieve the protection goals
is only part of the information that is needed for an automated selection between alternative IT
services at runtime. The missing part for an economic and value-oriented selection is an assessment
of the expected loss for each protection goal in the case of its violation. These values mainly depend on the actual business process that is executed and typically varies from instance to instance.
Therefore, the expected losses have to be determined context-specific for each instance. For
example, one activity of a purchasing process might require sending a document to the supplier. A
box of screws could be ordered with lower confidentiality than a special component that might
inform competitors about a new product and thus imply a competitive disadvantage. Bringing
together the CIA measures of the IT service with the CIA requirements of the business process
facilitates a risk-based selection of the most suitable IT service at runtime. Thus, an orchestration of
the IT services ex ante, i.e., when designing the business process, becomes obsolete and, assuming
an appropriate extension of the business process model, can be delegated to the business process
execution engine.
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However, the required assessment of the expected loss in the case of a protection goal violation is a
complex task and can hardly be realized by assessing each single activity of a business process that
is supported by an IT service. Therefore, a hierarchical model is proposed where elements inherit
their values from superordinated elements, e.g. a core processes from its superordinated business
process. Such hierarchical models are very well known in business process management, e.g. within the framework of British Telecom [11] or the breakdown of business processes through to core
processes and detailed processes [15]. If such a uniform “inheritance” is too broad, the values can
be adapted on every level and for every instance of the modeled business process as needed.
Equipping each IT service with CIA measures as described in section 3 and each IT supported
activity of a business process with corresponding monetary values allows an automated decision
between alternative IT services, taking not only costs but also risk into consideration. Then, the
expected costs E of an IT service k can be calculated as sum of the direct costs (e.g. for using the
service) and indirect costs (e.g. cost of changing between services) Costk and the expected loss in
the event of a confidentiality breach LoC, loss of integrity LoI, and non-availability LoA:
E k = Cost k + (1 − C k ) ⋅ LoC + (1 − I k ) ⋅ LoI + (1 − Ak ) ⋅ LoA

(7)

The expected costs have to be calculated for every IT service that comes into question to support
the considered activity of the business process. According to a value-oriented and a risk-neutral
decision strategy, the service which results in the lowest expected costs is to be chosen. For demonstration purposes, the example above is revived: a business process activity requires sending a
document and there are three functionally identical IT services (e.g. e-mail, Internet form via https,
and EDI) available with their CIA measures as described in section 3.4. The direct costs for sending
the document amount to 0.01 € for IT Service1, 0.02 € for IT Service2, and 1.10 € for IT Service3.
Indirect costs are ignored for keeping the example simple. In the first scenario, when ordering a box
of screws, a violation of confidentiality would result in no loss, a violation of integrity would cost
25.00 € due to sending back the wrong box, and non-availability of the service would cost 1.70 €.
Calculating the expected costs for each service shows that IT Service2 is the one to be chosen:
E1 = 0.01€ + (1 − 0.977) ⋅ 0.00€ + (1 − 0.987) ⋅ 25.00€ + (1 − 0.998) ⋅ 1.70€ = 0.34€
E 2 = 0.02€ + (1 − 0.971) ⋅ 0.00€ + (1 − 0.989) ⋅ 25.00€ + (1 − 0.986) ⋅ 1.70€ = 0.32€

(8)

E 3 = 1.10€ + (1 − 0.9935) ⋅ 0.00€ + (1 − 0.992) ⋅ 25.00€ + (1 − 0.9765) ⋅ 1.70€ = 1.34€

In the second scenario, when ordering a special component, where the pure fact of ordering could
inform competitors about a new product, a violation of confidentiality would result in a high loss
and cost 30,000.00 €, a violation of integrity would also cost 25.00 €, and again, non-availability
1.70 €. In this scenario, the calculation of the expected costs for each service would change to:
E1 = 0.01€ + (1 − 0.977) ⋅ 30,000.00€ + (1 − 0.987) ⋅ 25.00€ + (1 − 0.998) ⋅ 1.70€ = 690.34€
E 2 = 0.02€ + (1 − 0.971) ⋅ 30,000.00€ + (1 − 0.989) ⋅ 25.00€ + (1 − 0.986) ⋅ 1.70€ = 870.32€

(9)

E 3 = 1.10€ + (1 − 0.9935) ⋅ 30,000.00€ + (1 − 0.992) ⋅ 25.00€ + (1 − 0.9765) ⋅ 1.70€ = 196.34€

Thus, it would be advisable to send the order via IT Service3. Taking only the costs into consideration or fixing an IT service statically to an activity at the moment of business process design
would inherently result in a non-optimal selection.

5. Discussion and Outlook
In future SOA, where several alternative IT services are available for realizing activities of business
processes, a method is required to select the most suitable one. Statically fixing a specific service to
a specific business process activity at design time, or even selecting the IT service dynamically by
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only taking costs into consideration, results in a non-optimal selection from a value-oriented view.
Therefore, in this contribution, a method for taking riskiness of IT services into consideration has
been developed and presented. Protection goals from IT security research, namely confidentiality,
integrity and availability are proposed as “risk interface” between the IT service and the business
process. A value-oriented selection of IT services requires two extensions: business process models
have to be extended with economic values for not achieving protection goals and IT service
descriptions have to be extended with measures for achieving these protection goals.
For extending IT service descriptions, CIA measures have been introduced relying on CVSS data.
One significant advantage of this approach is that the determination of CIA measures follows a
methodic approach and can be automated. It allows the actual relevance of known vulnerabilities to
be considered, e.g. if there is a known automated exploit of a vulnerability, this will be reflected in
the respective CVSS values and, thus, immediately change the CIA measures of every corresponding IT service. However, there are also several limitations in our approach. One clear subject of
further discussion is our interpretation of the CIA measures as probabilities. While a connection
between CIA measures and probabilities of violations seem plausible, it remains subject to further
research whether this assumption holds or not and how a company’s specific situation can be taken
into consideration, e.g., through adjusted CVSS data. However, should a more precise method for
calculating actual probabilities of meeting protection goals become available, it would be easy to
extend our approach without having to change the whole risk-based selection of IT services. As
mentioned above, additional protection goals such as authentication or accountability can easily be
included whenever the required information about corresponding vulnerabilities is available.
A further point of discussion is the application of the CIA measures for IT services provided by
external suppliers. For IT services integrated from outside the company’s domain, it usually will
not be possible to analyze vulnerabilities according to the service and the underlying IT infrastructure. However, the proposed CIA measures can also serve as external metrics that can be
monitored without knowing internal metrics of the service itself and thus be integrated into SLA.
For calculating the measures, the external service provider has to transform them into internal
metrics and this can be achieved by applying the proposed method. In this case, the approach
presented has to be extended to cope with the additional trust issues, e.g., by integrating control
goals of compliance management – a challenging topic of further research.

Literature
[1] BHATT, G.D.; GROVER, V., Types of Information Technology Capabilities and Their Role in Competitive
Advantage: An Empirical Study, in Journal of Management Information Systems. Vol. 22(2) (2005), pp. 253-277.
[2] BISHOP, M., Computer Security: Art and Science, 2nd ed., Addison Wesley, Pearson Education, Boston, 2003.
[3] BÖHME, R.; NOWEY, T., Economic Security Metrics, in Eusgeld, I. et al. (Eds.), Dependability Metrics, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science 4909, Springer, Berlin 2008, pp. 176-187.
[4] BRANDL, K., Exchange Web Services Windows Vista Gadget, 2008.
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc535019(EXCHG.80).aspx [2008-06-08].
[5] BURROWS, J.H., Guidelines for Security of Computer Application, Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 73, National Bureau of Standards, 1980.
[6] CAMPBELL, S.; MOHUN, V., Mastering Enterprise SOA with SAP NetWeaver and mySAP ERP, John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., New York, New York 2006.
[7] CHESS, B.; McGRAW,G., Static Analysis for Security, in IEEE Security and Privacy. Vol. 2(6) (2004), pp. 76-79.
[8] Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), Mitre Organization, 2008. http://cve.mitre.org [2008-11-13].

365

[9] Common Vulnerability Scoring System, FIRST - Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, 2007.
http://www.first.org/cvss [2008-04-22].
[10] CURBERA, F.; KHALAF, R.; MUKHI, N.; TAI, S.; WEERAWARANA, S., The Next Step in Web Services, in
Communications of the ACM. Vol. 46(10) (2003), pp. 29-34.
[11] DAVIS, R., Exploring Process Modelling: Benefits, Practices and Pitfalls, in Proceedings of the Australasian
Process Days 2006, Sydney 2006.
[12] GEER, D.; HOO, K.S.; JAQUITH, A., Information Security: Why the Future Belongs to the Quants, in IEEE
Security and Privacy. Vol. 1(4) (2003), pp. 24-32.
[13] GISOLFI, D., Web services architect, Part3: Is Web services the reincarnation of CORBA?, 2001.
http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/webservices/library/ws-arc3 [2007-09-03].
[14] KARABULUT, Y.; KERSCHBAUM, F.; MASSACCI, F.; ROBINSON, P.; YAUTSIUKHIN, A., Security and
Trust in IT Business Outsourcing: a Manifesto, in El. Notes in Theoretical Comp. Science. Vol.179 (2007), pp. 47-58.
[15] MADISON, D., Process Mapping, Process Improvement, and Process Management: A Practical Guide to
Enhancing Work and Information Flow, Paton Press, Chico, California 2005.
[16] MILLS, S., The future of business – Aligning business and IT to create an enduring impact on industry, in IBM
Thought Leadership Paper, 2007. ftp://ftp.software.ibm.com/software/soa/pdf/future_of_business.pdf [2007-11-30].
[17] MÜLLER, G.; PFITZMANN, A.; RANNENBERG, K., IT Security and Multilateral Security, in Müller, G. and
Rannenberg, K. (Eds.) Multilateral Security in Communications, Addison-Wesley 1999, pp. 21-29.
[18] RÖHRIG, S., Using Process Models to Analyse IT Security Requirements, Thesis, University of Zürich 2003.
[19] SACHDEVA, N.; SCHMIDT, M.-T., Key WebSphere Service Registry and Repository scenarios in business
process management, IBM White Paper, 2008.
ftp://ftp.software.ibm.com/software/websphere/BPM_WSRR_WP_010308.pdf [2008-04-05].
[20] SACKMANN, S., A Reference Model for Process-oriented IT Risk Management, in W. Golden et al. (Eds.), 16th
European Conference on Information Systems, Galway, Ireland 2008.
[21] SACKMANN, S., Assessing the effects of IT changes on IT risk – A business process-oriented view, in M. Bichler
et al. (Eds.): Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik MKWI’08, GITO, Berlin 2008, pp. 1137-1148.
[22] SALVATI D.; DIERGARDT M., Towards a Scenario Based Risk Model for Information Systems, 2007.
http://www.lsa.ethz.ch/people/phd/salvatid/DS-Scenario-Based-Risk-Model.pdf, [2008-01-12].
[23] SANCHEZ, R., Strategic Flexibility in Product Competition, in: Strategic Management Journal, Special Issue on
Technological Transformation and the New Competitive Landscape. Vol. 16 (1995), pp. 135-159.
[24] SCHNEIER, B., Attack Trees, in Dr. Dobb’s Journal. Vol. 24(12) (1999), pp. 21-29.
[25] SCOTT, J.E., Mobility, Business Process Management, Software Sourcing, and Maturity Model Trends:
Propositions for the IS Organization of the Future, in Information Systems Management. Vol. 24 (2007), pp. 139-145.
[26] SHEYNER, O.; HAINES, J.; JHA, S.; LIPPMANN, R.; WING, J., Automated Generation and Analysis of Attack
Graphs, in Proceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (2002), pp. 273-284.
[27] STYTZ, M., Who Are the Experts, and What Have They Done for Us Lately?, in IEEE Security and Privacy.
Vol. 5(6) (2007), pp. 78-80.
[28] TANENBAUM, A.S., Structured computer organization, 2nd ed., Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey
1984.
[29] WOHED, P.; VAN DER AALST, W.M.P.; DUMAS, M.; TER HOFSTEDE, A.H.M.; RUSSELL, N., On the
Suitability of BPMN for Business Process Modelling, Business Process Management, in Dustdar, J.L. et al. (Eds.),
BPM 2006, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4102, Springer, Berlin (2006), pp. 161-176.
[30] WOLF, G.; PFITZMANN, A., Empowering Users to Set Their Protection Goals, in Müller G.; Rannenberg, K.
(Eds.) Multilateral Security in Communications. Addison-Wesley 1999, pp. 113-135.

366

